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We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. The 
model we analyze is the same as in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006). An active court 
can improve on the outcome that the parties would achieve without it. The institutional role of 
the court is to maximize the parties’ welfare under a veil of ignorance. In Anderlini, Felli, and 
Postlewaite (2006) the possibility of “menu contracts” between the informed buyer and the 
uninformed seller is described but not analyzed. Here, we fully analyze this case. We find that 
if we maintain the assumption that one of the potential objects of trade is not contractible ex-
ante, the results of Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006) survive intact. If however we let 
all “widgets” be contractible ex-ante, then multiple equilibria obtain. In this case the role for 
an active court is to ensure the inefficient pooling equilibria do not exist alongside the 
superior ones in which separation occurs. 
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this note is to add to the analysis in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite
(2006) (henceforth AFP) by considering explicitly the possibility that the informed
buyer may oﬀer the seller a menu contract. This is a pooling contract across dif-
ferent buyer types that immediately becomes binding, and that contains an array of
contractual arrangements. Which contractual arrangement applies is then left to a
declaration by the buyer.
In two separate papers, Maskin and Tirole (1990, 1992) examine the general case
of an “Informed Principal” problem. Among other insights, they point out that,
under certain conditions a menu contract equilibrium may Pareto improve over other
types of arrangements.
The buyer in AFP has private information and, ex-ante, makes a take-it-or-leave-
it oﬀer to the seller. Therefore he is an informed Principal.1 Since one of the key
steps in AFP asserts that with a passive court the equilibrium outcome is ineﬃcient,
it is important to consider whether allowing for menu contracts can yield superior
investment and trading outcomes relative to what we identiﬁed there.
We ﬁnd that if we maintain the assumption that one of the potential objects of
trade is not contractible ex-ante, the results of AFP survive intact. If however we let
all widgets be contractible ex-ante, then multiple equilibria obtain. In this case the
role for an active court is to ensure that the ineﬃcient pooling equilibria do not exist
alongside the superior ones in which separation occurs.
1.1. Outline
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, for completeness, we
review the model and results in AFP. In Section 3 we present the new results, and
Section 4 brieﬂy concludes. For ease of exposition all proofs have been gathered in
1The model in fact falls within the case of “Common Values” examined in Maskin and Tirole
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the Appendix.2
2. The AFP Model and Results
2.1. Passive Courts
A buyer B and a seller S face a potentially proﬁtable trade of three widgets, denoted
w1, w2 and w3 respectively.
Widgets w1 and w2 require a widget- and relationship-speciﬁc investment I > 0 on
B’s part. The buyer can only undertake one of the two widget-speciﬁc investments,
The value and cost of both w1 and w2 are zero in the absence of investment, so that
only one of them can possibly be traded proﬁtably.
The cost an value of w3 do not depend on any investment. To begin with assume
that w3 is not contractible at the ex-ante stage. Non-contractibility means that w3
can be traded regardless of any ex-ante decision. In practice, in this case we can
think of w3 as being traded (or not) at the ex-post stage. When menu contracts are
introduced the diﬀerence between w3 being contractible or not at the ex-ante stage
will become crucial. In all the AFP results reviewed in this Section it is not.
The buyer has private information at the time of contracting. He knows his type,
which can be either α or β. Each type is equally likely, and the seller does not know
B’s type.
As in AFP, we take the cost and value of the three widgets to be as in the table
below, where they are represented net of the cost of investment I > 0.3 In each cell
of the table, the left entry represents surplus, and the right entry represents cost
2In the numbering of Propositions, Lemmas, equations and so on, a preﬁx of “A” indicates that
the relevant item can be found in the Appendix.
3The gross value is therefore computed as the sum of cost, surplus and I, while the gross cost is
the cost value reported in table (1).Active Courts and Menu Contracts 3
(obviously the sum of the two gives the value, net of investment cost).
w1 w2 w3
Type α ∆M, cL ∆H, cL −∆H, cH
Type β ∆N, cL ∆L, cL ∆S, cS
(1)
As in AFP, for the remainder we take these parameters to satisfy the following.
Assumption 1. Parameter Values: The values of cost and surplus in the matrix in
(1) satisfy
(i) 0 < ∆L < ∆M < ∆H
and
(ii) ∆M + ∆H < ∆S
and
(iii) cS + ∆H + ∆S +
∆M
2
< cH < ∆S + 2 ∆M
and
(iv) 0 < −∆N < ∆H − ∆M − ∆L
and
(v) cL < cS
The costs and values of the three widgets are not contractible. Any contract
between B and S can only specify the widget(s) to be traded, and price(s). The
Court can only observe (verify) which one of w1 or w2 is speciﬁed in any contract,
and whether the correct widget is traded or not as prescribed, and the appropriate
price paid.
Assume that B has all the bargaining power at the ex-ante contracting stage, while
S has all the bargaining power ex-post.
To sum up, the timing and relevant decision variables available to the trading
parties are as follows.Active Courts and Menu Contracts 4
The buyer learns his type before meeting the seller. Then B and S meet at the ex-
ante contracting stage. At this point B makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer of a contract
to S, which S can accept or reject. A contract consists of a pair si = (wi,pi), with
i = 1,2 specifying a single widget to trade and at which price. After a contract (if
any) is signed, B decides whether to invest or not, and in which of the speciﬁc widgets.
After investment takes place (if it does), the bargaining power shifts to the seller
and we enter the ex-post stage. At this point S makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to
B on whether to trade any widget not previously contracted on and at which price,
which B can accept or reject. Without loss of generality, we can restrict S to make a
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to B on whether to trade w3 and at which price p3. After B
decides whether to accept or reject S’s ex-post oﬀer (if any), production takes place.
First S produces the relevant widgets and then he learns his cost.4 Finally, delivery
and payment occur according to contract terms.
2.2. Active Courts
The information of B, S and C and their bargaining power remain as described above.
The timing, investment requirements and all the elements of the matrix in (1) also
stay the same.
The Court announces a set of ex-ante contracts U which will be “upheld” and a
set of ex-ante contracts V which will be “voided.” There are two contracts in all to
be considered, one of the type s1 = (w1,p1) and another of the type s2 = (w2,p2).
We restrict C to be able to announce that certain contracts will be upheld or voided,
only according to the widget involved. Therefore U and V are two mutually exclusive
subsets of {s1,s2} with U ∪ V = {s1,s2}, so that eﬀectively the Court’s strategy set
consists of a choice of V ⊆ {s1,s2}.
We restrict C to make deterministic announcements; each contract is either in V
or not with probability one.
4The reason to assume that production costs are sunk before S learns what they are is to prevent
the possibility of ex-post revelation games a la Moore and Repullo (1988) and Maskin and Tirole
(1999).Active Courts and Menu Contracts 5
If V = ∅ so that all contracts are enforced, then the model is exactly as described
in Subsection 2.1 above. If on the other hand one or two contracts are in V, in the ﬁnal
stage of the game B and S are free to renegotiate the terms (price and delivery) of
any widget in the voided contract, regardless of anything that was previously agreed.5
Notice that, by our assumptions on bargaining power, this means that S is free to
make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to B of a price pi at which any wi with voided contract
terms is to be delivered.6
The court chooses V so as to maximize its payoﬀ which equals the sum of the
payoﬀs of B and S.7,8
2.3. Results
The two main results in AFP are reported below, without proof, purely for the sake
of completeness.
First, when the court enforces all contracts ineﬃcient pooling obtains.
Proposition 1. Equilibrium With A Passive Court: Suppose the Court enforces all
contracts, and that Assumption 1 holds. Then the unique equilibrium outcome of the
model is that the two types of buyer pool with probability one: they both invest and
trade w2 at a price p2 = cL, and they both trade w3 at a price p3 = ∆S + cS.






. By deﬁnition, this is also the Court’s payoﬀ.
5As well as negotiating the terms of trade for w3, as before.
6Implicitly, this means that we are taking the view that “spot” trade is feasible ex-post even
when contract terms are voided by the Court.
7Clearly, following a particular choice by C multiple equilibrium payoﬀs could ensue in the relevant
subgame. When multiple equilibria arise in some relevant subgames, we deem something to be an
equilibrium of the entire model when it is an equilibrium considering the Court as an actual player,
complete with its equilibrium beliefs. For more on the distinction between a classical “planner” and
a planner who is also a player see Baliga, Corchon, and Sj¨ ostr¨ om (1997).
8Throughout, by equilibrium we mean a Sequential Equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson 1982), or
equivalently a Strong Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991), of the game at
hand. We do not make use of any further reﬁnements. However, it should be pointed out that
whenever we assert that something is an equilibrium outcome, then it is the outcome of at least one
Sequential Equilibrium that passes the Intuitive Criterion test of Cho and Kreps (1987).Active Courts and Menu Contracts 6
Second, when the court intervenes and voids contracts for w2 ex-ante welfare
improves.
Proposition 2. Equilibrium With An Active Court: Suppose the Court is an active
player that can choose V as above, and that Assumption 1 holds. Then the unique
equilibrium outcome of the model is that C sets V = {s2} and the two types of buyer
separate: the type α buyer invests and trades w1 at a price p1 = cL and does not
trade w3; the type β buyer does not invest and only trades w3 at a price p3 = ∆S +
cS.






. By deﬁnition, this is also the Court’s payoﬀ.
3. Menu Contracts
Allowing menu contracts changes the terms on which the AFP model justiﬁes Court
intervention, but still provides a robust rationale for active Courts.
The eﬀect of allowing menu contracts depends critically on whether we maintain
the assumption that w3 is not contractible ex-ante. If we do, the AFP results hold
essentially unchanged.9
If on the other hand we allow ex-ante contracting on w3, as well as menu con-
tracts the picture changes. When menu contracts and ex-ante contracting on w3 are
both allowed, if the Court enforces all contracts, multiple equilibrium outcomes ob-
tain. Pooling as in Proposition 1 is an equilibrium. However, the model also has an
equilibrium in which a (non-trivial) menu contract is oﬀered and the same separating
outcome as in Proposition 2 obtains. Clearly, even in this case an active Court has a
role in eliminating any possibility for the parties to ineﬃciently pool in equilibrium.
The Court will step in when it expects ineﬃcient pooling to occur.
9When w3 is contractible ex-ante, the prices at which each widget is traded, when w3 is traded
as well as w1 or w2, become indeterminate. The equilibrium trading and investment outcomes are
as before. See Proposition 3 below.Active Courts and Menu Contracts 7
In order to proceed, we need to be precise about two new elements of the model:
the set of possible contracts when ex-ante contracting on w3 is allowed, and the set
of possible menu contracts built on the basis of these.
When w3 can be contracted ex-ante, two types of contracts need to be considered
(still abstracting from menu ones). For want of a better term we label them simple and
bundle. A simple contract, as before, consists of a pair si = (wi,pi), with i = 1,2,3,
specifying a single widget to trade and at which price.
A bundle contract consists of an oﬀer to trade a speciﬁc widget wi i = 1,2 and
the regular widget w3 at prices pi and p3 respectively; a bundle contract is denoted
by a triplet b1,3 = (wi,pi,p3).10 So, as well as possible oﬀers of s3, b1,3 and b2,3, we
now need to consider any possible choice of V ⊆ {s1,s2,s3,b1,3,b2,3}.
We also need to specify what a menu contract is. This is not hard to de-
ﬁne. A menu ex-ante contract is a pair (mα,mβ) with both mα and mβ elements
of {s1,s2,s3,b1,3,b2,3} if ex-ante contracting on w3 is allowed, and just elements of
{s1,s2} if ex-ante contracting on w3 is not allowed.11 The interpretation is that mα is
the contract that rules if the Buyer announces that he is of type α after the contract
is accepted and becomes binding, while mβ is the relevant arrangement if the Buyer
announces that he is of type β.
With little loss of generality, we take V ⊆ {s1,s2,s3,b1,3,b2,3} and V ⊆ {s1,s2},
depending on whether ex-ante contracting on w3 is allowed or not, even when menu
contracts are allowed. In essence, we are restricting the Court to uphold or void on
the basis of the applicable part of the menu. In other words on the basis of the part
of the menu which rules as a result of the Buyer’s declaration.
Proposition 3. Menu Contracts and Non-Contractible w3: Assume that menu con-
tracts are allowed and that w3 is not ex-ante contractible. Suppose that Assumption
10There is no need to consider any other possible bundles since trading both w1 and w2 is never
proﬁtable. The two speciﬁc widgets are mutually exclusive since, by assumption, the buyer can only
undertake one widget-speciﬁc investment.
11For simplicity, we restrict attention to pure strategy equilibria when menu contracts are allowed.
That is, we do not allow the buyer to randomize across diﬀerent menu contracts.Active Courts and Menu Contracts 8
1 holds.














We can now proceed to the case of w3 contractible at the ex-ante stage.
Proposition 4. Menu Contracts and Contractible w3 – Passive Court: Let menu c-
ontracts be allowed and assume that w3 is ex-ante contractible. Let Assumption 1
hold, and assume that the Court upholds all contracts. Then:
(i) There is an equilibrium of the model in which the trading and investment
outcome is as in Proposition 1. The menu contract in this equilibrium is degenerate
in the sense that both types of buyer oﬀer the same menu contract and mα = mβ.
Both types of buyer invest in and trade trade w2 and both types of buyer trade w3.







(ii) There is an equilibrium of the model in which the trading and investment
outcome is the same as in Proposition 2: the type α buyer invests in and trades
w1, and the type β buyer trades w3. The menu contract is this equilibrium is non-
degenerate in the sense that both types of buyer oﬀer the same contract and mα 6=
mβ. The type α buyer invests in and trades w1, while the type β buyer does not
invest in either w1 or w2, and trades w3. The total amount of expected surplus (net







(iii) There is no equilibrium of the model in which the total amount of expected







Finally, we turn to the case of an active Court.Active Courts and Menu Contracts 9
Proposition 5. Menu Contracts and Contractible w3 – Active Court: Assume that
menu contracts are allowed and that w3 is ex-ante contractible. Suppose that As-
sumption 1 holds. Suppose that the Court voids all contracts involving w2. In other
words suppose that V = {s2,b2,3}.
Then the unique equilibrium trading and investment outcome of the ensuing sub-
game is the same as in Proposition 2: the type α buyer invests in and trades w1, and
the type β buyer trades w3.
Any equilibrium that sustains this this equilibrium outcome is non-degenerate in
the sense that both types of buyer oﬀer the same menu contract and mα 6= mβ. The
type α buyer invests in and trades w1, while the type β buyer does not invest in either
w1 or w2, and trades w3.
In equilibrium, the total expected surplus (net of investment) is the maximum








The main purpose of this note is to explore fully the eﬀects of allowing menu contracts
in the AFP model of active courts.
The main ﬁnding is that the eﬀect of menu contracts depends critically on whether
w3 (the widget whose cost and value do not depend on investment) is contractible
ex-ante or not.
If w3 is not contractible ex-ante then the results in AFP survive unchanged.
If, on the other hand, w3 is contractible ex-ante the multiple equilibria emerge.
When the court does not intervene both separation and ineﬃcient pooling are possible
in equilibrium.
In the latter case the model still provides a robust rationale for court intervention:
when the court steps in and voids contracts for w2, the only possible equilibrium is
the superior one involving separation. Court intervention shrinks the equilibrium set,
destroying the ineﬃcient pooling equilibrium.Active Courts and Menu Contracts 10
Appendix






β) denote the menu contract oﬀers of the type α and the type β buyer
respectively. We ﬁrst show that Proposition 1 still holds. The two types of buyer








There are three main cases to consider. The ﬁrst is a possible equilibrium in
which Mα 6= Mβ. In this case the two types of buyer would separate at the contract-
oﬀer stage. The same argument as in Proposition 1 can be used to establish that this
cannot happen in any equilibrium of the model when the Court enforces all contracts.
In other words, we conclude that there is no equilibrium of the model with passive
Courts when menu contracts are allowed and w3 is not contractible ex-ante in which
Mα 6= Mβ.






β. In this case, the same argument as in Proposition 1 can be used to
establish that the only possibility is that of an equilibrium in which the two types of












β. Let mα = mα
α
= mα




Clearly, in equilibrium we need the “truth-telling” constraints to be satisﬁed: mα
and mβ must be such that the type α buyer does not prefer to declare that he is of
type β, and, symmetrically, the type β buyer does not prefer to declare that he is of
type α. We will show that these constraints are in fact impossible to satisfy.
Since mα 6= mβ, after declaring α, the buyer will be unable to trade w3 since
the seller’s beliefs must be that he is facing a type α buyer with probability one.
Moreover, after declaring β the buyer will trade w3 ex-post at a price p3 = ∆S + cS.Active Courts and Menu Contracts 11
This is because the seller’s beliefs in this case are that he is facing a type β buyer
with probability one. There are four sub-cases to consider.
The ﬁrst sub-case is that of mα and mβ both being contracts for w1, so that mα




by declaring α, the type α buyer receives a payoﬀ of ∆M + cL − pα
1, while if he
declares β he receives a payoﬀ of ∆M + cL − p
β
1 + cH − ∆H − ∆S − cS. Therefore,





1 ≥ cH − ∆H − ∆S − cS (A.1)
By declaring β, the type β buyer obtains a payoﬀ of ∆N + cL + I − p
β
1. If instead
he declares to be of type α he obtains a payoﬀ of∆N + cL + I − pα
1. Hence to satisfy






However, (A.1) and (A.2) cannot both be satisﬁed because of Assumption 1 (parts i
and iii).
The second sub-case we consider is that of mα and mβ both being contracts for




2 respectively. Reasoning in the same way as for the ﬁrst case, the truth-telling





2 ≥ cH − ∆H − ∆S − cS (A.3)






However, just as in the ﬁrst case, (A.3) and (A.4) cannot both be satisﬁed because
of Assumption 1 (parts i and iii).Active Courts and Menu Contracts 12
The third sub-case is that of mα and mβ being contracts for w1 and w2 respectively,
with prices oﬀered pα
1 and p
β





1 ≥ cH − ∆M − ∆S − cS (A.5)
while the truth-telling constraint for the type β buyer tells us that





However, (A.5) and (A.6) cannot both be satisﬁed because of Assumption 1 (parts i,
iii and iv).
The fourth sub-case is that of mα and mβ being contracts for w2 and w1 respec-
tively, with prices oﬀered pα
2 and p
β
1. The truth-telling constraint for the type α buyer





2 ≥ cH + ∆M − 2∆H − ∆S − cS (A.7)
while the truth-telling constraint for the type β says that





However, (A.7) and (A.8) cannot both be satisﬁed because of Assumption 1 (part i,
iii and iv).
We conclude that there is no equilibrium of the model with passive Courts when







Therefore, we have shown that Proposition 1 still holds. In any equilibrium of the
model with passive Courts when menu contracts are allowed and w3 is not contractible
ex-ante the two types of buyer must pool and trade both w2 and w3, yielding an







There remains to show that Proposition 2 still holds. When menu contracts areActive Courts and Menu Contracts 13
allowed and w3 is not contractible ex-ante, in equilibrium, an active Court chooses V







Because of a standard hold-up problem caused by the relationship-speciﬁc in-
vestment (see for instance Lemma A.6 of AFP), in any of the subgames following C
choosing a V that contains wi, i = 1,2, in equilibrium, neither type of B invests in
wi, and hence it is not traded.
It follows that without loss of generality whenever V equals either {s1} or {s2}
we can restrict attention to menu contracts that specify the same widget in both
components. Incentive-compatibility then ensures that any equilibrium menu contract
would have to specify the same price for the single widget appearing in both menu
entries. In other words, the only candidates for equilibrium are degenerate menus in
which mα = mβ. Given this, the claim can be proved using the same argument used
to prove Proposition 2 above. The details are omitted.
Proof of Proposition 4 (i): Take the degenerate menu oﬀered by both types of
buyer to be one that speciﬁes mα = mβ = s2 = (w2,cL). In other words, the candidate
equilibrium has the degenerate menu specifying that w2 will be traded at a price p2
= cL, regardless of the buyer’s announcement. Moreover, in the proposed equilibrium
both types of buyer trade w3 ex-post at a price p3 = ∆S + cS.
In the proposed equilibrium the type α buyer obtains a payoﬀ of cH − ∆S − cS,
the type β buyer obtains a payoﬀ of ∆L, and the seller obtains an expected payoﬀ of
∆S − cH/2 + cS/2.
The argument proceeds in two steps. The ﬁrst step is to show that neither type
of buyer can proﬁtably deviate from the proposed equilibrium by making an oﬀer of
a contract of the type s1, s2, s3, b1,3 or b2,3. The second is to show that neither type
of buyer can proﬁtably deviate from the proposed equilibrium by oﬀering a menu
contract diﬀerent from the equilibrium one.
The ﬁrst step involves several cases.
Using the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 1 we already know that
no type of buyer can proﬁt from a unilateral deviation to oﬀering any other simpleActive Courts and Menu Contracts 14
contract of the type s1 or s2. Therefore, it only remains to show that no type of buyer
can proﬁt from a unilateral deviation to oﬀering a contract of type s3, b1,3 or b2,3.
It is easy to see that (see for instance Lemma A.1 of AFP), regardless of his
beliefs, the seller will reject any oﬀ-path oﬀer of an s3 contract specifying a price p0
3
< ∆S + cS. (This is because cH − ∆H > ∆S + cS by Assumption 1 (parts i and iii),
and hence the seller will either trade w3 ex-post at a price p3 = ∆S + cS or will not
trade it at all, depending on his beliefs.)
Now consider a possible deviation by the type α buyer to oﬀering s3 with a
price p0
3 ≥ ∆S + cS. In this case (a standard hold-up problem arises because of
the relationship-speciﬁc investment, see for instance Lemma A.6 of AFP), he will not
trade either w2 or w1. Hence his payoﬀ after the deviation would be cH − ∆H − p0
3.
Therefore for this to be a proﬁtable deviation we need cH − ∆H − p0
3 > cH − ∆S−cS.
Since p0
3 ≥ ∆S + cS, this is possible only if ∆H < 0, which is false by Assumption 1
(part i). We can the conclude that the type α buyer cannot proﬁt from any deviation
to oﬀering a contract of the s3 variety.
Next, consider a possible deviation from the type β buyer to oﬀering s3 with a
price p0
3 ≥ ∆S +cS. In this case (again, a standard hold-up problem arises because of
the relationship-speciﬁc investment, see for instance Lemma A.6 of AFP), he will not
trade either w2 or w1. Hence his payoﬀ after the deviation would be ∆S + cS − p0
3
≤ 0. Since his payoﬀ in the candidate equilibrium is positive, we conclude that the
type β buyer cannot proﬁt from any deviation to oﬀering a contract of the s3 variety.
The next case is to consider a possible deviation by the type α buyer to a bundle
contract of the type b2,3. Let the prices speciﬁed by the contract be denoted by p0
2
and p0
3. For this to be a proﬁtable deviation for the type α buyer we need ∆H + cL
− p0
2 + cH − ∆H − p0
3 > cH − ∆S −cS, which implies cL + ∆S +cS > p0
2 + p0
3. Let
the seller’s oﬀ-path beliefs, after receiving the oﬀer of b2,3, be that he is facing a type
α buyer with probability ν ∈ [0,1]. For the seller to accept b2,3 we need p0
2 − cL +
p0
3 − ν cH − (1−ν)cS ≥ max{0,∆S +cS − ν cH − (1−ν)cS}. This is because if he
rejects the b2,3 oﬀer, then either w3 will be traded at a price p3 = ∆S +cS, or will not
be traded at all, depending on the seller’s beliefs. But the last inequality implies p0
2Active Courts and Menu Contracts 15
+ p0
3 ≥ cL + ∆S + cS. Hence we conclude that the type α buyer cannot proﬁt from
any deviation to oﬀering a contract of the b2,3 variety.
Consider now a possible deviation by the type β buyer to a bundle contract of the
type b2,3. Let the prices speciﬁed by the contract be denoted by p0
2 and p0
3. For this
to be a proﬁtable deviation for the type β buyer we need ∆L + cL − p0
2 + ∆S + cS
− p0
3 > ∆L, which implies cL + ∆S + cS > p0
2 + p0
3. Let the seller’s oﬀ-path beliefs,
after receiving the oﬀer of b2,3, be that he is facing a type α buyer with probability
ν ∈ [0,1]. For the seller to accept b2,3 we need p0
2 − cL + p0
3 − ν cH − (1 − ν)cS
≥ max{0,∆S + cS − ν cH − (1 − ν)cS}. This is because if he rejects the b2,3 oﬀer,
then either w3 will be traded at a price p3 = ∆S + cS, or will not be traded at all,
depending on the seller’s beliefs. But the last inequality implies p0
2 + p0
3 ≥ cL +
∆S + cS. Hence we conclude that the type β buyer cannot proﬁt from any deviation
to oﬀering a contract of the b2,3 variety.
The next case we consider is that of a possible deviation by the type α buyer to
oﬀering a bundle contract of the b1,3 variety. Let the prices speciﬁed by the contract
be denoted by p0
1 and p0
3. For this to be a proﬁtable deviation for the type α buyer
we need ∆M + cL − p0
1 + cH − ∆H − p0
3 > cH − ∆S − cS, which implies ∆M +
cL + ∆S + cS − ∆H > p0
2 + p0
3, which using Assumption 1 (part iv) in turn implies
∆S + cS − ∆L > p0
2 + p0
3. Let the seller’s oﬀ-path beliefs, after receiving the oﬀer of
b1,3, be that he is facing a type α buyer with probability ν ∈ [0,1]. For the seller to
accept b1,3 we need p0
1 − cL + p0
3 − ν cH − (1 − ν)cS ≥ max{0,∆S + cS − ν cH −
(1 − ν)cS}. This is because if he rejects the b2,3 oﬀer, then either w3 will be traded
at a price p3 = ∆S +cS, or will not be traded at all, depending on the seller’s beliefs.
But the last inequality implies p0
1 + p0
3 ≥ ∆S + cL + cS. Hence we conclude that
the type α buyer cannot proﬁt from any deviation to oﬀering a contract of the b1,3
variety.
The last case we need to consider to conclude the ﬁrst step in the proof is that
of a possible deviation by the type β buyer to oﬀering a bundle contract of the b1,3
variety. Let the prices speciﬁed by the contract be denoted by p0
1 and p0
3. For this to
be a proﬁtable deviation for the type β buyer we need ∆N − p0
1 + ∆S + cS − p0
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∆L, which implies ∆S + cS + ∆N − ∆L > p0
2 + p0
3. Let the seller’s oﬀ-path beliefs,
after receiving the oﬀer of b1,3, be that he is facing a type α buyer with probability
ν ∈ [0,1]. For the seller to accept b1,3 we need p0
1 − cL + p0
3 − ν cH − (1 − ν)cS
≥ max{0,∆S + cS − ν cH − (1 − ν)cS}. This is because if he rejects the b2,3 oﬀer,
then either w3 will be traded at a price p3 = ∆S + cS, or will not be traded at all,
depending on the seller’s beliefs. But the last inequality implies p0
1 + p0
3 ≥ ∆S + cL
+ cS. Hence we conclude that the type β buyer cannot proﬁt from any deviation to
oﬀering a contract of the b1,3 variety.
We have now ruled out the possibility that either type of buyer could proﬁtably
deviate from the proposed equilibrium by making an oﬀer of a contract of the type
s1, s2, s3, b1,3 or b2,3. The second step in the argument rules out the possibility that
either type of buyer can proﬁtably deviate from the proposed equilibrium by oﬀering
a menu contract diﬀerent from the equilibrium one. It involves considering several
cases again.
Consider ﬁrst the possibility that either type of buyer deviates to oﬀering a de-
generate menu with mα = mβ. In this case, the same argument we used in the ﬁrst
step clearly suﬃces to prove the claim.
Therefore, there remains to consider the case of some type of buyer deviating to
oﬀering a non-degenerate menu contract M = (mα,mβ) with mα 6= mβ. Clearly in
this case, without loss of generality, we can take it to be the case that the menu M
satisﬁes the truth-telling constraints: mα and mβ must be such that the type α buyer
does not prefer to declare that he is of type β, and, symmetrically, the type β buyer
does not prefer to declare that he is of type α. If this were not the case, the seller
would believe that one of the two menu items will be chosen with probability one
when the buyer announces his type. Therefore, the same argument as in the case of
a degenerate menu would suﬃce to prove the claim.
It is convenient to classify the possible deviations to non-degenerate menus M that
satisfy the truth-telling constraints into three mutually exclusive subsets. We say that
a menu contract is of class α if it has the property that, if accepted, it constitutes
a strictly proﬁtable deviation (given truth-telling) from the proposed equilibrium forActive Courts and Menu Contracts 17
the type α buyer, but not for the type β buyer. The class of such menu contracts is
denoted by Mα. We say that a menu contract is of class β if it has the property that,
if accepted, it constitutes a strictly proﬁtable deviation (given truth-telling) from the
proposed equilibrium for the type β buyer, but not for the type α buyer. The class
of such menu contracts is denoted by Mβ. We say that a menu contract of class ω
if it has the property that, if accepted, it constitutes a strictly proﬁtable deviation
(given truth-telling) from the proposed equilibrium for both the type α and the type
β buyer. The class of such menu contracts is denoted by Mω. Clearly, to conclude
the proof it suﬃces to show that no type α buyer can proﬁtably deviate by oﬀering
a menu M ∈ Mα, no type β buyer can proﬁtably deviate by oﬀering a menu M ∈
Mβ, and no buyer of either type can proﬁtably deviate by oﬀering a menu M ∈ Mω.
Consider a possible deviation by a type α buyer to a menu M ∈ Mα. In this case,
we assign oﬀ-path equilibrium beliefs to the seller that he is facing a buyer of type α
with probability one. These beliefs clearly satisfy the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and
Kreps (1987) (see footnote 8 above). The seller believes that the mα component of
M will apply with probability one after the buyer declares his type. It follows that
the same argument used in the ﬁrst step of this proof to show that the type α buyer
cannot proﬁtably deviate to a contract of type s1, s2, s3, b1,3 or b2,3 now suﬃces to
show that he cannot proﬁt from a deviation to a menu M ∈ Mα.
Next, consider a possible deviation by a type β buyer to a menu M ∈ Mβ. In
this case, we assign oﬀ-path equilibrium beliefs to the seller that he is facing a buyer
of type β with probability one. These beliefs clearly satisfy the Intuitive Criterion
of Cho and Kreps (1987) (see footnote 8 above). The seller believes that the mβ
component of M will apply with probability one after the buyer declares his type. It
follows that the same argument used in the ﬁrst step of this proof to show that the
type β buyer cannot proﬁtably deviate to a contract of type s1, s2, s3, b1,3 or b2,3 now
suﬃces to show that he cannot proﬁt from a deviation to a menu M ∈ Mβ.
Consider now a possible deviation by a type α buyer to a menu M ∈ Mω. In
this case, we assign oﬀ-path equilibrium beliefs to the seller that he is facing a buyer
of type α with probability one. These beliefs clearly satisfy the Intuitive CriterionActive Courts and Menu Contracts 18
of Cho and Kreps (1987) (see footnote 8 above). The seller believes that the mα
component of M will apply with probability one after the buyer declares his type. It
follows that the same argument used in the ﬁrst step of this proof to show that the
type α buyer cannot proﬁtably deviate to a contract of type s1, s2, s3, b1,3 or b2,3 now
suﬃces to show that he cannot proﬁt from a deviation to a menu M ∈ Mα.
Lastly, consider a possible deviation by a type β buyer to a menu M ∈ Mω. As
we speciﬁed above, in this case we assign oﬀ-path equilibrium beliefs to the seller
that he is facing a buyer of type α with probability one. These beliefs clearly satisfy
the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) (see footnote 8 above). The seller
believes that the mα component of M will apply with probability one after the buyer
declares his type.
Recall that the argument used in the ﬁrst step of this proof to show that the
type β buyer cannot proﬁtably deviate to a contract of type s1, s2, s3, b1,3 or b2,3
applies regardless of the seller’s oﬀ-path beliefs following the deviation. Therefore,
that argument also suﬃces to now show that he cannot proﬁt from a deviation to a
menu M ∈ Mω.
Proof of Proposition 4 (ii): Take the equilibrium non-degenerate menu contract
to be M = (mα,mβ) with mα of the s1 variety with a price p1 = ∆M + cL − cH +
∆S + cS and mβ of the s3 variety with a price p3 = ∆S − ∆M + cS.
In this candidate equilibrium the type α buyer gets a payoﬀ (under truth-telling)
of ∆M + cL − p1 = ∆M + cL − ∆M − cL + cH − ∆S − cS = cH − ∆S − cS, while
the type β buyer obtains a payoﬀ (under truth-telling) of ∆S +cS − p3 = ∆S +cS −
∆S + ∆M − cS = ∆M and the seller gets an expected payoﬀ (under truth-telling) of
(p1−cL)/2 + (p3−cS)/2 = ∆S − cH/2 + cS/2. Crucially, notice that the type β buyer
has a payoﬀ strictly greater than the one he obtains in the equilibrium constructed in
the proof of Proposition 4 (i). The type α buyer and the seller have the same payoﬀs
as the ones they obtain in the equilibrium constructed in the proof of Proposition 4
(i).
We begin by verifying that the proposed equilibrium contract satisﬁes the neces-Active Courts and Menu Contracts 19
sary truth-telling constraints. The truth-telling constraint for the type α buyer can
be written as
p3 − p1 ≥ cH − ∆H − cL − ∆M (A.9)
which is satisﬁed for p1 = ∆M + cL − cH + ∆S + cS and p3 = ∆S − ∆M + cS by
Assumption 1 (part i).
The truth-telling constraint for the type β buyer can be written as
∆S − ∆N ≥ p3 − p1 (A.10)
which is satisﬁed for p1 = ∆M + cL − cH + ∆S + cS and p3 = ∆S − ∆M + cS by
Assumption 1 (part iii and iv).
Consider now a possible deviation by the type α buyer to oﬀering a simple contract
of the s2 variety. At best, he would be able to get a payoﬀ of cH − ∆S − cS. This
is because the seller will not accept any oﬀer to trade w2 for a price below cL, and
the type α buyer, at best (depending on the seller’s beliefs) will be able to trade w3
ex-post for a price of ∆S + cS. Since cH − ∆S − cS is also his payoﬀ in the proposed
equilibrium, we conclude that the type α buyer cannot proﬁt from a deviation to
oﬀering a simple contract of the s2 variety.
Next, consider now a possible deviation by the type β buyer to oﬀering a simple
contract of the s2 variety. At best, he would be able to get a payoﬀ of ∆L. This
is because the seller will not accept any oﬀer to trade w2 for a price below cL, and
the type β buyer, at best (depending on the seller’s beliefs) will be able to trade w3
ex-post for a price of ∆S + cS. Since ∆L < ∆M, we conclude that the type β buyer
cannot proﬁt from a deviation to oﬀering a simple contract of the s2 variety.
All other possible deviations can be ruled out using the computations (including
the oﬀ-path beliefs that they use) in the proof of Proposition 4 (i). This is because
the equilibrium payoﬀs to both types of buyer in the equilibrium proposed here are at
least as large as the payoﬀs that they receive in the equilibrium constructed there.Active Courts and Menu Contracts 20
Proof of Proposition 4 (iii): Suppose that there were an equilibrium in which






. Then using Assumption 1 (parts i and
ii) the equilibrium would have to be of one of the following three varieties. The ﬁrst
variety involves type α buyer trading w2 only and the type β buyer trading w1 and
w3. The second variety involves the type α buyer trading w2 only and the type β
buyer trading w3 only. The third variety involves the type α buyer trading w1 only
and the type β buyer trading w2 and w3.
As in the proof of Proposition 3, throughout the argument we let Mα = (mα
α,mβ
α)
and Mβ = (mα
β,m
β
β) denote the menu contract oﬀers of the type α and the type β
buyer respectively.
There are three main cases to consider. The ﬁrst is a possible equilibrium in which
Mα 6= Mβ. In this case the two types of buyer would separate at the contract-oﬀer
stage. Because of separation at the contract-oﬀer stage we can take it to be the
case that both Mα and Mβ are degenerate menus, with Mα = (mα,mα) and Mβ =
(mβ,mβ).
There are two possible ways to obtain an equilibrium of the ﬁrst variety when
Mα 6= Mβ. The ﬁrst is that mα = s2 and mβ = s1, with the type β buyer trading
w3 ex-post. This possibility can clearly be ruled out in the same way as in the
proof of Proposition 1. The second way is to have mα = s2 and mβ = b1,3. In such
putative equilibrium, the type α buyer would obtain a payoﬀ of ∆H, since clearly the
s2 contract would have to specify p2 = cL. Notice also that, given separation, the
seller can trade w3 ex-post for a payoﬀ of ∆S if he rejects the type β buyer oﬀer of
b1,3. It follows that the contract b1,3 contains prices p1 and p3 such that p1 + p3 =
∆S + cL + cS. Therefore, by deviating to pooling with the type β buyer, the type
α buyer would obtain a payoﬀ of cH − ∆H − ∆S + ∆M − cS. Using Assumption 1
(part iii) this is a proﬁtable deviation. Therefore we can conclude that the putative
equilibrium is not viable.
A possible equilibrium of the second variety when Mα 6= Mβ can be ruled out by
noticing that in any case this will involve trading w2 at a price p2 = cL and w3 at a
price p3 = ∆S +cS. Therefore this possibility can clearly be excluded out in the sameActive Courts and Menu Contracts 21
way as in the proof of Proposition 1.
There are two possible ways to obtain an equilibrium of the third variety when
Mα 6= Mβ. The ﬁrst is that mα = s1 and mβ = s2, with the type β buyer trading w3
ex-post. This possibility can clearly be ruled out in the same way as in the proof of
Proposition 1. The second way is to have mα = s1 and mβ = b2,3. In such putative
equilibrium, the type α buyer would obtain a payoﬀ of ∆M, since clearly the s1
contract would have to specify p1 = cL. Notice also that, given separation, the seller
can trade w3 ex-post for a payoﬀ of ∆S if he rejects the type β buyer oﬀer of b2,3. It
follows that the contract b2,3 contain prices p2 and p3 such that p2 + p3 = ∆S + cL
+ cS. Therefore, by deviating to pooling with the type β buyer, the type α buyer
would obtain a payoﬀ of cH − ∆S − cS. Using Assumption 1 (parts i and iii) this
is a proﬁtable deviation. Therefore we can conclude that the putative equilibrium is
not viable.






β. Clearly, no equilibria of the ﬁrst, second or third variety can be
sustained in this case. This is because in all three varieties, the two types of buyer
do not trade the same widget w1 or w2.





β. Let mα = mα
α
= mα




As in the proof of Proposition 3, in equilibrium we need the “truth-telling” con-
straints to be satisﬁed: mα and mβ must be such that the type α buyer does not
prefer to declare that he is of type β, and, symmetrically, the type β buyer does not
prefer to declare that he is of type α. We will show that these constraints are in fact
impossible to satisfy in any of the three varieties of equilibria.
Notice that, since mα 6= mβ, whenever mα is a simple contract for either w1 or
w2, after declaring α, the buyer will be unable to trade w3 since the seller’s beliefs
must be that he is facing a type α buyer with probability one. Moreover, whenever
mβ is a simple contract for either w1 or w2, after declaring β the buyer will trade w3
ex-post at a price p3 = ∆S + cS. This is because the seller’s beliefs in this case areActive Courts and Menu Contracts 22
that he is facing a type β buyer with probability one.
There are two ways to support a possible equilibrium of the ﬁrst variety when





β. The ﬁrst is with mα and mβ being simple









2 ≥ cH + ∆M − 2∆H − ∆S − cS (A.11)
while the truth-telling constraint for the type β says that





However, (A.11) and (A.12) cannot both be satisﬁed because of Assumption 1 (part
i, iii and iv). The second is with mα being a simple contract of the s2 variety and mβ













2 ≥ cH + ∆M − 2∆H (A.13)
while the truth-telling constraint for the type β says that







However, (A.13) and (A.14) cannot both be satisﬁed because of of Assumption 1
(parts i and iii).





β, to support an equilibrium of the
second variety we would have to have mα and mβ being simple contracts for w2 and
w3 respectively, with prices oﬀered pα
2 and p
β
3. The truth-telling constraint for the
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Using Assumption 1 (parts ii, iii and v), (A.15) implies that p
β
3 > pα
2. If the seller
rejects the menu contract, he will trade w3 ex-post at a price of ∆S + cS with equal
probability with either type of buyer. Hence by rejecting the oﬀer the seller obtains
an expected proﬁt of ∆S − cH/2 + cS/2. By standard arguments the menu contract

















which together with p
β
3 > pα
2 implies that p
β
3 > ∆S + cS. However, the latter implies
that the type β buyer would get a negative proﬁt from the putative menu contract
equilibrium. This is not possible since he can always not invest and not trade and
guarantee a payoﬀ of zero.
There are two ways to support a possible equilibrium of the third variety when





β. The ﬁrst is with mα and mβ being simple
contracts for w1 and w2 respectively, with prices oﬀered pα
1 and p
β
2, and the type β





1 ≥ cH − ∆M − ∆S − cS (A.17)
while the truth-telling constraint for the type β buyer tells us that





However, (A.17) and (A.18) cannot both be satisﬁed because of Assumption 1 (parts
i, iii and iv). The second is with mα being a simple contract of the s1 variety and mβ
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On the other hand, the truth-telling constraint for the β type buyer implies that







However, inequalities (A.19) and (A.20) cannot be both satisﬁed because of Assump-
tion 1 (parts i, iii, iv and v).
Proof of Proposition 5: We begin by arguing that the equilibrium constructed
in the proof of Proposition 4 (ii) is still viable when the Court sets V = {s2,b2,3}.
This is straightforward since the Court now makes some deviations impossible. The
remaining deviations can be shown not to be proﬁtable in the same way as in the the
proof of Proposition 4 (ii).
Given that V = {s2,b2,3}, since a standard hold-up problem arises beceuse of the
relationship-speciﬁc investment (see for instance Lemma A.6 of AFP), we can be sure
that in no equilibrium of the model will it be the case that either (or both) types of
buyer will invest in w2, and hence it will not be traded.
To show that the type α buyer investing in and trading w1 and the type β buyer
trading w3 is the unique equilibrium outcome the following three varieties of equilib-
rium outcomes need to be ruled out. The ﬁrst variety is one in which both types of
buyer invest in and trade w1. The second variety is one in which both types of buyer
trade w3. The third variety is one in which the type α buyer trades w3, while the
type β buyer invests in and trades w1.
Consider an equilibrium of the ﬁrst variety. This outcome cannot be sustained
without using menu contracts in equilibrium. This can be proved using the same
argument as in the proof of Proposition 2. For the same reason, this outcome cannot
be sustained using menu contracts in an equilibrium in which the two types of buyer
separate at the contract-oﬀer stage by oﬀering Mα 6= Mβ. Suppose that Mα = Mβ





β. In this case
clearly we must have that the menu contracts specify p1 = cL. Hence, just as in the
proof Proposition 2, the type β buyer has an incentive to deviate. Lastly, suppose





β. Then, since both menu items mustActive Courts and Menu Contracts 25




Hence, in equilibrium pα
1 = p
β
1 = cL, and therefore the type β buyer has an incentive
to deviate as before.
Any equilibrium of the second variety can be ruled out in a completely analogous
way as any equilibrium of the ﬁrst variety. The details are omitted.
Consider now an equilibrium of the third variety. From the surplus and cost
matrix in (1) it is evident that the sum of the payoﬀs of the two types of buyer and
of the seller in any such equilibrium is negative. Hence at least one of the players will
have a proﬁtable deviation to not trading at all.Active Courts and Menu Contracts 26
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